State of Utah v. D. John Musselman and Linda Ann Coram : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1981
State of Utah v. D. John Musselman and Linda Ann
Coram : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Richard I. Ashton; Attorneys for Appellant;
David L. Wilkinson; Leon A. Halgren; Attorneys for Respondent;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, State v. Musselman, No. 18161 (Utah Supreme Court, 1981).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2805
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
------------------~---------~-~----------
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 




D. JOHN MUSSELMAN and 













Case No. 18161 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third 
District Court for Salt Lake County 
Honorable G. Gal Taylor, Judge 
RICHARD I. ASHTON 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
LEON A. HALGREN 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
FOX, EDWARDS & GARDINER 
American Plaza II, Suite 400 
57 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 F.ILED 
Attorneys for Appellant 
MAR 3 '.- 19c.~ 
. ' 
-· ~ ...................... M••••••······· .. 
, Cl"'~ Snprama Court, Uteh 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 




D. JOHN MUSSELMAN and 












Case No. 18161 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third 
District Court for Salt Lake County 
Honorable G. Gal Taylor, Judge 
RICHARD I. ASHTON 
FOX, EDWARDS & GARDINER 
American Plaza I I, Suite 4 00 
57 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Appellant 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
LEON A. HALGREN 
Assistant Attorney Genera.I 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE ---------------- 1 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT--------------------- 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ---------------------------- 2 






REFUSAL OF LOWER COURT TO SET 
ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT DID NOT 
CONSTITUTE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN 
VIEW OF DEFENDA.~T-APPELLANT' S 
FAILURE TO PROFFER ANY MERITORIOUS 
DEFENSE. ------------------------------
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT rs ESTOPPED 
FROM RAISING ANY OF HIS ALLEGED 
DEFENSES AS SET FORTH IN HIS PROPOSED 
ANSWER TO THE COMPLAINT. --------------
THE DENIAL OF THE MOTION TO SET 
ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT WAS NOT 







Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.




Airkem Intermountain, Inc., et al. v. Parker, 
513 P.2d 429 (l973) ------------------------------ 11 
American Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Pierce, et al., 
498 P.2d 648 (1972) ------------------------------ 11 
Board of Education of Granite School District v. 
Cox, 384 P.2d 806 (l963) ------------------------- 11 
Bawden and Associates, et al. v. Alvin R. Smith, 
et al., 624 P.2d 676 (1981) ---------------------- 7 
Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corporation, 
545 P.2d 507 (1976) ------------------------------ 6,7 
Pacer Sports and Cycle, Inc. v. Frank Myers, 
534 P.2d 616 (1975) ------------------------------ 11 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 55-lSd-l through 17 
(re-enacted in 1981 as Section 26-19-1 through 17)- 2 
RULES CITED 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60{b) (1) ------- 6 
(ii) 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 




D. JOHN MUSSELMAN and 














Case No. 18161 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant has appealed from a denial of a motion to 
set aside a judgment by default in the Third Juaicial District 
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable G. Hal Taylor presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court denied the motion of the defendant-
appellant to set aside the default judgment on the grounds 
that the defendant-appellant's proposed answer failed to state 
a defense and thereafter entered its order accordingly. The 
lower court made no finding or ruling on the issue of 
excusable neglect. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-respondent seeks a judgment and order 
affirming the aenial of defendant-appellant's motion to set 
aside the default judgRent. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Linda Ann Coram obtained a Medicaid grant from tbe 
State of Utah, Departmen~ of Social Services, whereby she 
received the benefit of a total sum of $82,522.22 paid by the 
State of Utah to her medical providers all of which payments 
allegedly resulted from improper treatment by her doctor. She 
assigned to the State the right to recover as against any 
liable third party these medical expenses and in 1979 the Utah 
Legislature enacted the Medical Benefits Recovery Act, Section 
55-lSd-l through 17 (re-enacted in 1981 as Section 26-19-1 
through 17), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. (Complaint 
and proposed answer.) 
Defendant-appellant was retained in 1979 to 
represent Linda Ann Coram in a malpractice action against the 
doctor who allegedly caused the need for the Medicaid grant 
which resulted in a pre-trial settlement of $150,000.00. 
Prior to pr0ceeding with the case, defendant-appellant 
contacted the State of Utah, Office of Recovery Services and 
inquired as to the State's Medicaid cla~ of $82,522.22 and 
thereafter agreed to collect said sum out of any recovery, 
taking for his services the sta~u~ory 25% contingency fee. 
2 
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When the case was settled, the insurance carrier issued two 
settlement drafts; one was in the sum of $67,477.78; payable 
to Linda Ann Coram, her husband and D. John Musselman 
(defendant-appellant); the other was in the sum of $82,522.22 
(the exact amount of the State's Medicaid claim), and was 
payable to Linda Ann Coram, her husband, D. John Musselman and 
the State of Utah Office of Recovery Services (emphasis 
added). Both drafts were issued on February 5, 1981. The 
draft in the sum of $82,522.22 shows endorsements as follows: 
"Linda Ann Corma, 11 "William Dyerl Coram," "D. John Musselman" 
and "State of Utah Office of Recovery Services by: D. John 
Musselman its Attorney at Law and in Fact." (Emphasis added). 
(Affidavit in Opposition of Motion to Set Aside Judgment and 
Transcript of Hearing of August 18, 1981). 
The draft of $82,522.22, hereinafter called 
"settlement draft," was deposited by defendant-appellant in 
Bank Account No. 71-31544-3 in the name of D. John Musselman 
and Associates at the Central Bank and Trust Company, 
Riverside Plaza Office, Provo, Utah, on or about March 10, 
1981, from which account funds were taken by D. John Musselman 
and loaned or otherwise used by him. The sum of $50,000.00 
was loaned out of this same bank account to Vernon Herbst of 
Blackfoot, Idaho, on April 14, 1981, by means of check no. 
160, drawn on said Account No. 71-31554-3, whereby said Vernon 
Herbst executed a promissory note which carried interest at 
3 
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the rate of 180% per annum (15% per month) and secured the 
promissory note with a deed of trust in which D. John 
Musselman was the named beneficiary. The state did not 
authorize the diverting of its funds obtained from the said 
settlement draft of $82,522.22. (Affidavit in Opposition of 
Motion to Set Aside Judgrnen t and Affidavit on Order to Show 
Cause) . 
Numerous letters were written to defendant-
appellant, demanding payment to the state of the money 
recovered in the settlement draft and after many promises to 
account were not kept, the plaintiff-respondent filed a 
lawsuit, No. C-81-4425, in the District Court of the Third 
Judicial District, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah. 
(Affidavit in Opposition of Motion to Set Aside Judgment). 
After defendant-appellant was served stnnmons and 
copy of said complaint, on June 4, 1981, he promised to 
account to plaintiff-respondent for said settlement draft 
funds which promises he failed to keep. On July 6, 1981, 
defendant-appellant talked on the telephone to a Mr. George 
Martindale, Investigator for the Off ice of Recovery Services, 
and was advised by Mr. Martindale that unless he made an 
L~mediate accounting to the State of Utah for the $ettlement 
draft funds or file a responsive pleading, the attorney for 
the State of Utah in Case No. C-81-4425 would have to default 
him. (Affidavit in Opposition of Motion to Set Aside 
Judgrnen t) • 
4 
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No communication was ever received from defendant-
appellant thereafter and a default certificate was entered on 
the 9th day of July, 1981, and judgment by default was granted 
and docketed on July 14, 1981. (Affidavit in Opposition of 
Motion to Set Aside Judgment, Default Certificate and Judgment 
by Default). 
On August 13, 1981, defendant-appellant filed a 
motion to set aside the judgment and noticed said motion for 
argument on the 18th day of August, 1981, at 2:00 o'clock p.m. 
The court ruled that notice of the motion did not comply with 
the rules as to time and, therefore, ruled that defendant-
appellant would have renotice of his motion to set aside the 
judgment. (Transcript of August 18, 1981, p. 7, lines 7 
through 11) . 
A hearing on a supplementary order was set for the 
same day before the Honorable G. Hal Taylor ana defendant-
appellant was then and there sworn under oath to answer 
questions concerning the disposition of the settlement funds. 
He admitted under oath the fee arrangement and acknowledged 
his endorsement of the settlement draft as the "Attorney in 
Law and in Fact" of the State of Utah Off ice of Recovery 
Services but thereafter took the Fifth Amendment on all other 
questions regarding the funds obtained from the settlement 
draft. (Transcript of Hearing on August 18, 1981). 
5 
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Defendant-appellant was ordered to appear on the 3rd 
day of November, 1981, at 2:00 o'clock p.m. before the court 
of the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County, Utah, in 
Civil Case No. C-81-4425, to then and there show cause, which 
order to show cause was supported by an affidavit. Defendant-
appellant did not file a counter-affidavit, nor did he offer 
to counter any of the statements in the supporting affidavit 
by sworn testimony. 
Cause) . 
(Motion, Affidavit and Order to Show 
The motion of defendant-appellant to set aside the 
default judgment was not noticed up on November 3, 1981, when 
the order to show cause was heard by the Honorable G. Hal 
Taylor; however, counsel for plaintiff-respondent agreed to 
waive the notice requirement and the court thereafter heard 
oral agrlli~ent on the motion to set aside the judgment from 
both counsel. Upon conclusion of the oral argument, the court 
denied the motion of defendant-appellant to set aside the 
default judgment on the grounds that the purported answer did 
not state a defense and entered its order accordin;ly, from 
which order defendant-appellant appeals. 
Hearing of November 3, 1981). 
6 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
REFUSAL OF LOWER COURT TO SET ASIDE THE 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT DID NOT CONSTITUTE ABUSE 
OF DISCRETION IN VIEW OF DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT' S FAILURE TO PROFFER ANY I 
MERITORIOUS DEFENSE. 
One of the prerequisites for grounds to set aside a 
judgment by default is the showing by the defendant that he 
has a valid and meritorious defense to the claims of the 
plaintiff. 
While the defendant-appellant in the instant case 
directed his argument in the lower court, for the most part, 
on the "excusable neglect" provisions of Rule 60(b) (1), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, the court in its ruling addressed 
itself only to the requirement that the defendant must proffer 
a meritorious defense to the plaintiff's complaint, a question 
of law. 
This principle of law was recently stated by this 
court in the case of Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney 
Corporation, 545 P.2d 507 {1976), wherein this court ruled in 
referring to the defendant-appellant in that case: 
A primary difficulty he confronts is that, 
as a general proposition one who seeks to 
vacate a default judgment must proffer 
some defense of at least ostensible merit 
as would justify a trial of the issue thus 
raised. As the trial court appropriately 
remarked on this point: the defendant 
fai~ea to proffer any meritorious defense, 
or in fact any defense at all. 
7 
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The theory of law as pronounced by this court in the Downey 
State Bank case, supra, was followed by this court in the 
recent case of Bawden and Associates, et al. v. Alvin R. 
Smith, et al., 624 P.2d 676 (1981). 
In the instant case there is no dispute on the basic 
facts as alleged in the complaint. The plaintiff paid under a 
Medicaid grant the total sum of $82,522.22 to medical 
providers who had rendered medical care to Linda Ann Coram as 
a direct result of allegedly being improperly treated for 
allergy. Linda Ann Coram retained D. John Musselman to 
represent her in a malpractice claim for her injuries and_ 
prior to filing the lawsuit D. John Musselman by letter 
inquired of the State's right of recovery and thereafter 
recognized the State's right to recover the said sLUn of 
$82,522.22 and claimed a fee of 25% of said sum as attorney's 
fees. 
Prior to trial, a settlement of $150,000.00 was 
effected and two separate drafts were issued by the insurance 
company. The draft for $82,522.22 which carried the name of 
the "State of Utah Office of Recovery Services," as one of the 
payees was personally endorsed by all the named payees except 
as to the State of Utah and, as to that payee,. D. John 
Musselman himself endorsed that payee's name and signed it as 
"its attorney in law and in fact." He, thereafter, deposited 
said draft in his trust account and failed to account to the 
State of Utah for any such funds. 
8 
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In his proposed "answer" the defendant-appel~an:. 
admits to all the material allegations in the complain~. Be 
admits the amount of the Medicaid assistance; he admits tte 
written assignment by Linda Ann Coram to the State o: ~tat of 
the right to recover the said Medicaid payments as aga2-ns-: a 
third party; he admits that in 1979 the Medical Benefi~s 
Recovery Act took effect, and, finally, he admits know~~g of 
the right of the plaintiff-respondent to recover the s2id 
Medicaid payments. 
In the supplemental order hearing before Juas e G. 
Hal Taylor the defendant-appellant was examined under oath and 
admitted the genuineness of the $82,522.22 settlement craft 
and his endorsement on the draft as the attorney for the State 
of Utah Off ice of Recovery Services and in his proposed 
"answer" he admits receiving the settlement, as allegec i.:-: the 
complaint, and that he notified the Department "that he had 
withheld the sum of $60,000.00 pending settlement wi~h ~he 
Department .... ," thereby admitting that he had negotia~ed the 
settlement draft on which the state was named as a payee and 
which draft he endorsed as the attorney for the State of t:~ah. 
The second defense as pleaded in the proposed 
"anSWPr," h . t f th th d . . 
- w ere1n are se or e a m1ss1ons and denials to 
the allegations of the complaint, certainly does not sE~ :orth 
a meritorious defense to the plaintiff's compla1· nt a ...... · S S _.i0\..-:1 Dy 
the entire record before this Honorable Court. 
9 
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POINT II 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT IS ESTOPPED FROM 
RAISING ANY OF HIS ALLEGED DEFENSES AS SET 
FORTH IN HIS PROPOSED ANSWER TO THE 
COMPLAINT. 
The proposed answer of defendant-appellant sets 
forth a third, fourth, fifth and sixth defense. Each of these 
defenses is asserted from the position that defendant-
appellant owes no fiduciary duty to plaintiff-respondent on 
the facts in the record of the instant case. 
Once defendant-appellant signed the settlement draft 
as "attorney at law and in fact" for the State of Utah Office 
of Recovery Services, he is estopped from asserting any 
defense which would be inimical and repugnant to his duty to 
the client {State of Utah) whom he purports to represent in 
such endorsing act. It would violate all principles of equity 
to allow an attorney by an overt act, such as endorsing a 
draft as the attorney for the payee, to obtain control of the 
payee's funds and thereafter be heard to say that he was not 
the payee's attorney, particularly after he had loaned out the 
major portion of the funds to a third party in his {the 
attorney's) own name, expecting to reap an unconscionable 
return thereon for his own benefit. Furthermore, the sixth 
defense which is raised by defendant-appellant is available 
only to the Medicaid recipient, Linda Coram, who is not a 
party to this action and whom defendant-appellant does not 
purport to be representing in the instant case. 
10 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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The position of defendant-appellant is incongruous. 
Once he endorsed the settlement draft as the "attorney at law 
and in fact" of the plaintiff-respondent he obtained control 
of the funds as a fiduciary of that named payee and should, 
therefore, be held to the strict rules of accounting to his 
principal for the funds thus collected and held. 
POINT III 
THE DENIAL OF THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
The lower court in denying the motion to set aside 
the default judgment did so on an issue of law. It had before 
it the uncontroverted affidavits of the plaintiff-responaent, 
setting forth the right of plaintiff-respondent to the funds 
and of defendant-appellant's conduct in obtaining control of 
the funds as a fiduciary and his subsequent misuse of these 
funds. The court in its ruling made no mention of the issue 
of excusable neglect. However, since the brief of 
defendant-appellant addresses this issue it will be discussed 
briefly. 
This court, many times, has stated that the trial 
court has a discretion in determining whether to set aside a 
default judgment and the determ1·nat1"on should 
only be reversed 
by this court for an abuse of discretion that 1·s artibtrary, 
capricious and not based on adequate findings of fact or on 
law. 
11 
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Pacer Sports and Cycle, Inc. v. Frank Myers, 
534 P.2d 616 (1975) 
Airkem Intermountain, Inc., et al. v. Parker, 
513 P.2d 429 (1973) 
American Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Pierce, et al., 
498 P.2d 648 (1972) 
Board of Education of Granite School District v. 
Cox, 384 P.2d 806 (1963} 
In defendant-appellant's motion and argument to set 
aside the judgment, he asserted that he was in the hospital 
for a stomach disorder from June 29, 1981 to July 4, 1981, a 
period of five days. He did not support this statement with 
any documentation nor did he counter the affidavit which 
stated that on the ·6th day of July, 1981, he was contacted on 
the telephone by George Martindale, Investigator for the 
Office of Recovery Services, and told that unless he 
immediately contact the attorney for the State and ask for 
more time or account and settle, a default would be entered 
and judgment by default taken. Nor did he counter the 
affidavit which stated that numerous times after the filing of 
the law suit defendant-appellant asserted that he would 
account to the State and pay the State its money recovered in 
the settlement, which promises he never kept. 
It appears obvious from the history of this case and 
the record before this court that the defendant-appellant, 
having loaned fifty thousand dollars ($50,000.00) of the 
settlement funds to a farmer in Idaho at an interest rate of 
12 
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180% per annum (15% per month), was stalling for sufficient 
time in order to realize a return of approximately thirty 
thousand dollars ($30,000.00) for four months of accured 
interest upon the repayment of the said loan, thus providing 
ample funds back in the trust account to fully account to the 
State on the settlement funds. 
The default judgment and subsequent proceedings 
before this court frustrated the scheme and brought to light 
the actions and conduct of defendant-appellant, thereby 
preventing the usage of the recovery funds to cover the 
shortage in the trust account. Although all of these facts 
came to light subsequent to the entry of the default judgment, 
they were all in the record at the time the court heard 
argument on the motion and rulea that the proposed answer did 
not state a valid defense to the State's right to recover as 
against the defendant-appellant. 
CONCLUSION 
Most of the record on appeal in the instant case was 
made before the lower court, Judge G. Hal T 1 · ay or, presiding, 
after the default judgment was entered by Judge Homer F. 
-
Wilkinson. The uncontroverted facts in the record on appeal 
as shown by affidavits and the sworn testimony of defendant-
appellant fail to clearly demonstrate excusable neglect but 
the record clearly shows that there is no meritorious defense 
which is or can be t a b 
asser e y defendant-appellant to justify 
13 
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a setting-asiae of the default judgment and a trial on the 
issues raised by the defendant-appellant in his proffered 
"answer." The court should, on the basis of the foregoing 
facts and the law, affirm the decision of the lower court and 
enter judgment accordingly. 
Dated this ;<__~day of March, 198 2. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
LEON A. HALGREN 
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